



# Preliminaries



Real estate finance

# The question


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- How should one price real estate assets?
- Asset: store of value with well defined property rights
- A title to a string of cash flows (or payoffs) to be received over time, and subject to some uncertainty
- Two basic tasks:
  1. Describe the distribution of payoffs (i.e. *forecast*)
  2. Price that distribution
- Arbitrage principle: “similar” assets should be priced in such a way that they earn similar returns
- Otherwise...



# Arbitrage opportunities

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# Opportunity cost of capital

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- Investing in a given asset is foregoing the opportunity to invest in other assets with similar properties
- Investor should be compensated for foregoing that opportunity
- Asset under consideration, therefore, should yield at least the same return as other similar assets



# IRRs

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- The IRR is the discount rate that makes the present value of expected cash flows equal to the initial investment cost
- There is only one correct way to compute an IRR:
  1. Compute expected cash flows
  2. Find the discount rate that makes the investment's net present value zero
- Reversing these steps is a typical and massive mistake



# IRRs: warm-up example

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- An asset pays \$500 in year 1, and a random cash-flow in year 2
- Year 2 CF is \$500 with probability  $p$ , 0 otherwise
- *Expected* second year CF is  $500p + 0(1-p) = 500p$
- Bond's IRR solves  $900 = 500/(1+r) + 500p/(1+r)^2$



# A deeper example: waterfall structures

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- Often, real estate projects include several equity holders
- Some simply fund the project, others have a hand in running it
- Equity can be split simply according to initial stake
- Split can also be conditional on performance to give the right incentives to managing stake-holders



# The IRR look-back model

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- Initial equity injection: \$1M, 10% managing owner, 90% pension fund
- Equity flows are 10% of initial injection in year 1, grow by 10% every year after that. In year five, reversion flow to equity is 10 times year 6 projected cash flow.
- Managing owners gets:
  1. 10% of net equity flows until 10% “hurdle” IRR is reached by the pension fund (Tier 1)
  2. 20% of remaining cash flows until 15% IRR is reached by the pension fund (Tier 2)
  3. 50% thereafter (Tier 3 cash flows a.k.a the gravy train)
- What are cash flows to both equity holders? What is the IRR of both equity holders? Who benefits the most from higher growth rates?





# Main asset pricing recipes

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1. **Discounted cash flow approach**
  - a. Write asset as a string of expected cash flows
  - b. Find return similar assets earn
  - c. Discount cash flows using that rate
  
2. **Ratio/Peer Group/Multiple approach**
  - a. Find a set of similar assets, with known value
  - b. Find average value/key statistic ratio
  - c. Apply that ratio to asset under consideration



# The multiple approach in real estate

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- Find a group of comparable properties ('Comps') with known value
- Comparable: similar location, purpose, vintage...
- Compute average ratio of value to gross rental income (**Gross Rent Multiplier** approach)
- Compute average ratio of Net Operating Income (NOI) to value, a key ratio known as the **Capitalization Rate**
- Get an estimate of the current Gross Rent and NOI for your target property, and apply ratio



# Example

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- A target property has a NOI of \$400,000
- You have obtained the following two recent sales data:

	NOI	Selling price
Property 1	\$424,200	\$4,200,000
Property 2	\$387,200	\$3,400,000

- What is the estimated value of your target using the cap rate approach (assign equal weights to the two sales)?
- 



# Solid comp case in Real Estate

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1. Quality of the comparables
2. Consistency of calculations
3. Good treatment of outliers



# Sources for real estate comps/multiples

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1. Databases of recent transactions: RCA analytics, Costar...
2. Survey data: PwC, RERC, CBRE, Costar...
3. “Fundamentals”



# NOI vs. EBITDA

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- $\text{NOI} = \text{operating income} - \text{operating expenses}$
- Like EBITDA, a fuzzy notion
- My preference is to figure cash operating expenses only, making my NOI equivalent to “Normalized EBITDA”
- But not everybody agrees...



# NOI vs. PBTCF

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- $\text{NOI} = \text{operating income} - \text{operating expenses}$
- $\text{BT bottom line} = \text{NOI} - \text{Capital Expenses}$   
 $= \text{Property Before Tax Cash Flow}$   
 $= \text{PBTCF}$
- Before-tax IRR is the discount rate that makes the PV of all future PBTCF equal to the property's price



# The holy trinity of real estate

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- Consider a property with current PBTCF cap rate  $y\%$
- Assume that PBTCF is expected to grow by  $g\%$  for ever
- Then the before-tax IRR associated with buying this property is:

$$r = y + g$$





# Cap rate “fundamentals”

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- NOI yield  $\approx$  required return (r)
  - expected income growth (g)
  - + investment rate (CAPEX/V)
  
- Required return =
  - + real risk-free rate
  - + expected inflation
  - + risk premium
  - + liquidity premium



# Example: Is Manhattan office overvalued?

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- Cap rates on Manhattan office have fallen back to pre-crisis levels
- Could spell trouble, but...
- ...PwC survey (Q2-2014) is consistent with current valuations:

Required return (r)	7.44%
- Cap rate ( <i>PBT</i> CF or <i>NOI</i> ?)	- 5.25%
- Rent growth (g)	- <u>3.67%</u>
	< 0

- ... and spreads over treasuries have actually risen
  - ... though not as much as in other markets
- 





# The class of real estate assets

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- Bedrock: real estate properties (land + structures affixed to it)
- Residential (deliver housing services) or Commercial (held for a business purpose)
- Real estate properties are strings of cash flows
- Real estate *assets* are all assets whose payoffs derive -- however remotely -- from some underlying property



# Some language

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- Debt: financial contract that gives specific claims to asset's payoff, but no ownership rights
- Equity: financial contract that gives only a residual (or subordinated) claim to asset's payoff, but carries ownership rights
- Public Markets: Markets with many buyers and sellers, observable transaction prices and sizes, and stringent disclosure rules
- Private Markets: Markets where transactions involve limited numbers of buyers and sellers, and where transaction information and financials need not be disclosed



# Real estate assets

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	Public Markets	Private Markets
Equity Assets	<b>REITs</b> <b>Mutual funds</b>	<b>Real Properties</b> <b>Private investment firms</b>
Debt Assets	<b>Mortgage-backed securities</b>	<b>Whole mortgages</b> <b>Venture debt</b>



# Mortgages

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- Mortgage: debt contract secured by a real estate property
- Characteristics:
  1. Initial balance or principal ( $b_0$ )
  2. Maturity ( $T$ )
  3. Yield (or contract rate) structure ( $r_t$ , for all periods  $t$ )
  4. Payment structure ( $m_t$ , for all periods  $t$ )
- Mechanics:
  1. At a given date, interest due is  $b_{t-1} r_t$
  2.  $b_t = b_{t-1} + b_{t-1} r_t - m_t$
  3. If  $b_T > 0$ , balance is due in one *balloon payment*



# Some language, and notes

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- Mortgage whose balance is zero after  $T$  periods ( $b_T=0$ ) are called *fully amortizing*
- Contract rate can be fixed, vary on a fixed schedule, or according to some other market rate
- Amortization can be negative -- balance can grow -- from one period to the next (if  $m_t < b_{t-1} r_t$ )
- *Interest-only mortgages* (IOMs) have payments equal interest due ( $m_t = b_{t-1} r_t$ ) for part of the contract





# FRMs: fixed-rate, fully amortizing mortgages

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- For all  $t$ :
  1.  $r_t = r$
  2.  $m_t = m$
- Fully amortizing:  $b_T = 0$
- What must  $m$  be? (Fixed annuity formulae)
- $m = b_0 r / (1 - (1+r)^{-T})$



# The lender's perspective

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- Full amortization means:

$$b_T=0, \quad \text{or, equivalently,} \quad b_0 = \sum_{t=1, \dots, T} m_t / (1+r)^t$$

- More generally:

$$b_0 = \sum_{t=1, \dots, T} m_t / (1+r)^t + b_T / (1+r)^T$$

- Absent points and whether or not amortization is full,  $r$  is the loan's IRR if all payments are made, i.e. the APR or YTM



# Fixed payment example

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- 100K, monthly payments, 10 years,  $r=7\%$ 
  1. With full amortization:  $m=\$1,161.08$
  2. With 30K balloon:  $m=\$987.76$



# Yield vs. return

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- Yield (APR) is the lender's IRR if **and only if** all payments are made as planned
- In practice, borrowers default, fail to make payments on time, refinance or prepay when interest rates are low,...
- Causes transaction costs, and capital losses
- $IRR < APR$
- Riskier borrowers should pay more
- But paying more makes default more likely...
- Fixed point problem, which may or may not have a solution: market exclusion



# GPMs: graduated payment mortgages

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- Can we design a fully-amortizing mortgage with contract rate  $r$  whose payments grow by  $g\%$  each period?
- Easy:
  1. Guess that the first payment is  $\$1$
  2. Calculate the corresponding payment schedule, and its PV at discount rate  $r$ , call it  $F$
  3. First payment must be  $m_1 = b_0/F$
  4. Rest follows trivially
- Logic: all payments are proportional to  $m_1$ , so is PV



# Midterm-style question


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- A borrower obtained a 100K mortgage with 2 yearly payments ( $T=2$ ), a 30K balloon, a rate of 7%, and payments that increase by 50% in year 2. What are the two payments?
- One unknown:  $m_1$
- Indeed,  $m_2 = 1.5 m_1$
- One equation:
$$100K = m_1/1.07 + 1.5m_1/1.07^2 + 30K/1.07^2$$
- $m_1 = \$32,875.49$ ,  $m_2 = \$49,313.24$




# The mortgage process

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# Underwriting criteria


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
# Underwriting criteria

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# Underwriting criteria

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# Underwriting criteria

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- Lenders tell brokers what they'll fund:
  1. Leverage (loan-to-value ratio)
  2. Credit worthiness of borrowers
  3. Proper documentation
  4. Ratio of projected cash-flows to debt-service
  5. ...
- Likewise, securitizers tell lenders what they'll buy
- When secondary markets are involved, lenders pass underwriting standards on to brokers



# The foreclosure crisis





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- Between 2004 and 2006, underwriting standards were greatly loosened in the residential market
- Low-down payment, delayed amortization products gained ground
- High-risk borrowers entered market, and products with slow build-up of equity proliferated
- When house prices collapsed in mid-2006, foreclosure rates skyrocketed like never before



# Recent trends in US housing

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Source: National Delinquency Survey, Mortgage Bankers Association

# Solving the foreclosure crisis

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- Almost all foreclosures involve negative equity...
- ... but most households with negative equity do NOT foreclose absent something else
- Second trigger: income difficulties (e.g. job loss)
- Obama plan subsidizes loan modification. It won't help much.
- Instead, plan should offer mortgage payment vouchers to households with verifiable income difficulties
- This is the Wi-Fur/Boston Fed plan



# REITs

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- Real Estate Investment Trusts
  1. buy, sell and hold real estate assets on behalf of a diffuse shareholder base
  2. manage these and other assets
  3. **are not taxed at the corporate level**
- Three basic types: equity, mortgage, hybrid
- Can be public or private
- UPREITs (U for “umbrella”) hold positions in corporations that invest in real estate, including other REITs



# Brief history


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- REIT act, 1960: REITs may be treated as untaxed, pass-through entities provided they satisfy a number of requirements
- Current requirements include:
  1. 75% of holdings in RE, cash, or US paper
  2. 75% of income must come from rents, dividends, mortgage interest, gains from the sale of qualifying assets or holdings in other REITs
  3. **90% of taxable income must be distributed to shareholders\***
  4. At least 100 shareholders
  5. Top 5 holders cannot hold more than 50% of shares
- 1986 tax reform removed two big downsides of REIT structure:
  1. Management activities were severely restricted
  2. Other forms of incorporations (LPs, especially) enjoyed preferential depreciation rules
- 1991 Kimco Realty IPO ushered in a new era for REITs






# Market capitalization of Public REITs



# Historical 12-month returns (e-REITs)

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# Mortgage-backed securities

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- **Basic idea:**
  1. Pool a large number of mortgages
  2. Sell the pool as a security, or use the pool as collateral for one or more debt instruments (bonds)
- **Purpose:**
  1. Allow more investors to invest in real estate debt instruments
  2. Make that investment more liquid
  3. Pool/fine-tune risk



# A machine to generate AAA paper

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- Why did securitization take off after 2000?
  - Among other things because AAA paper became scarce largely due to the global saving glut (US paper hogs)
  - AAA paper lubricates many key markets, the repo market in particular
  - Where to find it? There is, after all, only so many blue chip issuers
  - Answer: CMOs
  - Housing boom created endless supply of mortgages, only trick is to somehow issue safe bonds backed by unsafe assets
  - Sounds crazy, but it “works”: no AAA tranche of any CMO deal has defaulted to date (many have been downgraded, but none have formally defaulted)
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# The subordination theorem(s)

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**Theorem I:** Risk-free debt can be written against a pool *if and only if* the worst-case scenario CF realization from the pool is strictly positive

*Proof:* Let  $A$  be the lowest possible CF realization associated with the pool. Make the quantity of debt small enough that the promise is  $A$  or less.

**Theorem II:** Debt with less than a probability  $p$  of default can be written against a pool *if and only if* the CF realization is strictly positive with probability  $1-p$

*Proof:* Let  $A$  be such that  $P(\text{CF} > A) > 1-p$ . Make the quantity of debt small enough that the promise is  $A$  or less.

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# How about them CDOs and CDO<sup>2</sup>s?

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- Junior tranches of MBS are often pooled into new deals, often out of necessity (*investors won't pay much for stand-alone B tranches*)
  - If combining these tranches raises the lower bounds on overall cash-flows, more AAA paper can be produced with the right level of credit support
  - The problem: getting the level of credit support right
  - Top tranches of many CDO deals defaulted, which means that people overestimated the ability of pooling to dissipate risk
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# The game investment banks play

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- If you get the following trivial point, you understand securitization better than most people who say they understand securitization
- Given a pool of assets, investment banks choose a feasible security scheme  $E$  to write against a given pool of assets to solve:

$$\text{Max } MV(E) - C(E)$$

where  $MV(E)$  is the market value of scheme  $E$  given investors' willingness to pay for various type of assets while  $C(E)$  is the cost of issuing that combination of securities and funding the assets

- After 2000, the scope of securitization widened markedly to include riskier pools of assets because the willingness to pay for top tranches made deals profitable that weren't before
- 



# Mortgage securitization: a short history

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- The US government wanted liquid secondary markets for mortgages after the great depression: FNMA (1938), GNMA (1968), FHLMC (1970)
- Ginnie issues first pass-through in 1968
- Bank of America issues first private label pass-through in 1977
- Solomon Brothers and First Boston create the CMO concept in 1983





# Securitization process

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1. Mortgages are originated
2. Sold to and pooled by investment banker
3. Pool is used to create one or several securities:
  - i. Mortgage-backed bonds (MBBs)
  - ii. Mortgage pass-through securities (MPTSs)
  - iii. Mortgage pay-through bonds (MPTBs)
  - iv. Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs)



# What is the fuss about securitization?

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- Can reduce incentives for originators to do their homework
- Obfuscates risk
- Securitizers dictate what products are offered, for better or for worse
- Not particularly compelling, if you ask me...
- Much more compelling (heck, undeniable): higher demand for AAA made deals profitable that were not profitable before



# Derivatives

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- Derivatives are assets whose payoffs derive from some other asset or set of assets
- Example: swaps
- A swap contract stipulates an exchange of payoffs between two assets



# Real estate swap

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- Two parties exchange (risky) return from some real estate asset for a fixed return
- At origination, fixed rate is set so that the value of the swap is zero
- As time goes by, swap value rises or falls (symmetrically for the two counterparties)
- Swaps are traded in secondary markets, where investors can buy or sell exposure to real estate payoffs...
- ...without the underlying asset being much involved



# Real estate swap (continued)

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- In practice, RE swaps involve returns on large indices such as NCREIF, for various subtypes of institutional properties
- Institutional Properties: large, safe, premium quality properties in which institutional investors invest
- Say you own lots of properties; to offset the risk associated with your investment, you sell the NCREIF return to Credit Suisse for a safe return
- Hedge vs. systematic real estate risk



# Market has yet to take off

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- Four possible explanations:
  1. No NCREIF forwards
  2. A redundant asset
  3. “Liquidity begets liquidity”
  4. Tough to price
  
- More success in Europe with IPD instruments



# SWAP question example

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Credit Suisse has agreed to write a swap for a client who wants to sell (short) the total NCREIF yearly return over the next 2 years in exchange for a fixed return. Credit Suisse expects the relevant NCREIF return to be 6% in the first year and 13% in the second year. Payments are made at the end of each of the two years. Credit Suisse decides that the appropriate discount rate for this contract is 10% a year.

What fixed return will Credit Suisse offer to the swap buyer?

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# Credit-default swap (CDS)

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- Protection buyer owns asset subject to default (a MBS, say)
- Pays protection seller (AIG, say) fixed premia
- Seller covers default risk
- Perfect way to eliminate diversifiable risk
- Systematic risk remains, however
- Real-estate related CDS played a big role in the recent financial mess





# CDS question example

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AIG wants to sell a CDS on a Bond with two periods to expiration and notional=face value=100K. Default occurs in period 2 with probability 10% and would cause a loss of 20% of the face value for AIG.

What rate must AIG charge to generate an IRR of 5% on this deal?



# Real estate returns

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1. Indices
2. Surveys
3. Holy trinity
4. Asset pricing models



# Real estate returns: indices

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- *NCREIF property index (NPI)*: “quarterly ... total rate of return measure ... of a very large pool of individual commercial real estate properties. ...acquired, at least in part, on behalf of tax-exempt institutional investors”
- $\text{Return} \approx (\text{NOI} + \text{capital gains}) / (\text{Initial market value})$
- “Class A”, premium, institutional quality properties



# Two big issues with NPI

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- *Coverage*: institutional properties (owned directly or via JVs by untaxed institutional investors), large MSAs
- *Market values*: value is based on transactions when possible, but on appraisals or estimates in most cases




# Historical evidence, 1970-2003

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	Total Return	Volatility	Risk Premium
T Bills	6.30%	2.83%	NA
G Bonds	9.74%	11.76%	3.44%
Real Estate*	9.91%	9.02%	3.61%
Stocks	12.72%	17.48%	6.42%


\*NCREIF: large, institutional quality commercial properties

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


# Annual returns on NPI index

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


# Value of \$1 reinvestment: 1969-2003



— CPI    ● TBill    ▲ SP500    ■ LGBond    ◆ RE


# Bond and stock returns






# Real estate and stock returns

**Real Est. & Stock Ann. Returns, 1970-2003:  
+17% Correlation**



# Real estate and bond returns



### EXHIBIT 3: NCREIF APPRAISAL AND TRANSACTION CAP RATES



Source: NCREIF

# Cap rate sensitivity

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	<b>6% cap rate</b>	<b>7% cap rate</b>	<b>8% cap rate</b>
<b>Potential gross income</b>	\$1,000,000	\$1,000,000	\$1,000,000
<b>Less vacancy loss (5%)</b>	\$50,000	\$50,000	\$50,000
<b>Effective gross income</b>	\$950,000	\$950,000	\$950,000
<b>Less expenses (50%)</b>	\$475,000	\$475,000	\$475,000
<b>Net operating income</b>	\$475,000	\$475,000	\$475,000
<b>Divided by cap rate</b>	6%	7%	8%
<b>Value conclusion</b>	<b>\$7,916,667</b>	<b>\$6,785,714</b>	<b>\$5,937,500</b>



# Return to public equity investments


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- *NAREIT indices*: indices that track the performance of various synthetic portfolios of investments in publicly traded REITs
- Capitalization-weighted, total return indices
- Broken down – conveniently -- by area and asset type



# Historical 12-month returns (e-REITs)

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# Issues with NAREIT returns

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- **Comparability:**

1. REIT investments are highly liquid, returns reflect that
2. REITs tend to invest in class A properties
3. Levered equity returns: must de-lever before use


- **A volatile history:**

1. REIT Regulations have changed a lot since 1961
2. Boom-bust cycles



# Survey evidence

**Exh.11-6a: Investor Total Return Expectations (IRR) for Various Property Types\***




\*Source: Korpacz Investor Survey, 1st quarter 2005

	Malls	Strip Ctrs	Indust.	Apts	CBD Office	Suburb. Off.	Hou. Off	Manh Off
■ Institutional	9.27%	9.35%	9.28%	9.31%	9.56%	10.03%	10.58%	9.11%
■ Non-institutional	12.53%	11.00%	10.81%	10.80%	11.68%	12.05%	13.19%	10.38%



# Survey evidence (!! on NOI cap rates !!)

Exh.11-6b: Investor Cap Rate Expectations for Various Property Types\*



\*Source: Korpacz Investor Survey, 1st quarter 2005

	Malls	Strip Ctrs	Indust.	Apts	CBD Office	Suburb. Off.	Hou. Off	Manh Off
■ Institutional	7.33%	7.86%	7.88%	6.74%	8.26%	8.63%	9.19%	7.45%
■ Non-institutional	10.51%	9.50%	9.02%	8.00%	10.38%	10.18%	11.44%	8.59%

# Issues

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- Survey data, enough said



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“Practice?

You wanna talk about practice?”

(Allen Iverson, a.k.a “The Answer”)



# We wanna talk about practice

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- Sometimes, practice meshes well with theory
- Sometimes, it does not
- Common sense based approach dominate practice
- We want to discuss these methods because:
  1. they are time-tested
  2. they are the industry standard
  3. we all need jobs



# Cash-on-cash returns

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- $\text{CoC return} = \text{Cash flow in year 1} / \text{Initial cash investment}$
- $\text{Total cash return} = (\text{CF in year 1} + \text{Loan reduction} + \dots) / \text{Initial cash investment}$
- Rule: invest provided cash return exceeds some threshold



# Required cap rates / Band of investment

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- Required cap rate =  $LTV \times \text{mortgage constant}$   
+  $(1-LTV) \times \text{required return on equity}$
- Rule: invest if actual cap rate  $>$  required cap rate



# Front-door/Back-door analysis

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- Front-door criterion: What rent must the property earn **to cover acquisition and development costs?**
  - Rule: invest if the property is expected to produce that rent
  - Back-door criterion: Given market rent, what is the maximum **supportable acquisition and development cost?**
  - Rule: invest if the cost is below that upper-bound
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# A word about the global property market

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- The largest global investors are institutional (pension funds, sovereign funds, insurance companies...)
- Institutionally investable RE is estimated around \$16trn (1.15 x US GDP)
- Institutions are loath to invest RE directly because it is illiquid, lumpy, requires careful monitoring...
- Instead, they invest via listed (reits) and unlisted (funds) vehicles
- Funds can be open-ended (allow new investment and redemption) or closed-ended (funds are raised once and for all and deployed for a fixed period of time)
- Funds are classified as core, core-plus, value-added and opportunistic
- The fund model worked well until 2008, but has been under pressure since then
- Investors are asking for more control and more manager investment
- What will the new fund model look like?
- Read Baum and Hartzell (2011) for more





# Summary

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- The arbitrage principle
- Two basic asset pricing methods: multiple, DCF
- Real estate multiples: GRM, Cap rates
- Holy trinity of real estate finance:  $r \approx y + g$
- Real estate assets: properties, and beyond
- Debt/Equity, Private/Public
- REITs, CMBS', derivatives
- The “capital stack”
- Basic mortgage algebra, YTM, **APR**

